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Executive Summary and Recommendations 
Concerns about potential impacts of captive supply on fed cattle prices have been present for several years in 
both Canada and the US.  In Canada, the magnitude of concern escalated during closure of the US border to fed 
cattle trade (May 2003 to July 2005) and has remained at an elevated level.  Many producers in both Canada and 
the US argue that presence of captive supplies results in lower cash fed cattle prices.  These concerns have 
motivated policy proposals targeted toward controlling how fed cattle can be marketed and who can own and 
feed cattle.  However, captive supply arrangements evolved out of economic incentives of cattle producers and 
beef packers to engage in new business arrangements.  Therefore, policies that may curtail such practices are 
met with considerable opposition by those who enjoy direct benefits from these arrangements.   This study was 
designed to assist Alberta Beef Producers in their assessment of captive supplies and possible action paths.  We 
summarize what we know about the impacts of captive supply on fed cattle markets and identify market 
information and research needs related to fed cattle markets and captive supply in Canada. 
The impact of captive supplies in the US fed cattle market has been investigated in several published research 
studies.  Results generally confirm a statistically significant negative relationship between captive supply levels 
and cash fed cattle transaction prices.  However, these studies also consistently find very small magnitudes of 
economic impact of captive supplies on cash fed cattle prices.  Furthermore, a sizeable body of literature 
identifies a variety of benefits associated with captive supplies for both cattle producers and beef packers.  
Benefits include things such as reduced costs, opportunities for quality premiums, and market access/plant 
utilization assurances.   
The published empirical research regarding captive supply impacts on fed cattle markets have been completed in 
US fed cattle markets using US data.  As with any empirical work, results are sensitive to market fundamentals, 
levels and mixtures of captive supply, market structure, and related market conditions.  Our assessment is that 
findings from US studies are generally applicable to Canada, but important differences in the markets also make 
the findings of past research not completely applicable.  In particular, especially when the US border is closed, 
captive supplies could place increased downward pressure on Canadian cash fed cattle prices.  However, this is 
also the time when those who have marketing agreements likely garner the most benefit from a marketing 
agreement or contract with a packer in terms of assured market access.   
Captive supply levels present in Canada are greater now than during the time most past studies in the US were 
completed.  Recently captive supplies have comprised about 50-60% of total reported sales in Canada.  This 
could suggest greater impacts of captive supply in Canada on cash fed cattle market prices than found in 
previous work, especially if the US border is closed to fed cattle trade, but how much greater is uncertain.  
Furthermore, packer-owned cattle feeding tends to be more common in Canada than in the US, ranging from 15-
23% recently (compared to about 10% or less in the US).  Packer-owned cattle might have different impacts on 
cash fed cattle transaction prices than cattle secured under marketing agreements. This is because packer-owned 
cattle could be more easily used strategically by packers since the packer has total control over delivery timing.   
In contrast to packer-owned cattle, for cattle under marketing agreements delivery timing (the week of delivery) 
is at the discretion of the cattle feeder.  In our assessment of the Canadian fed cattle markets, we did not find 
evidence that packer-owned cattle were being used strategically to depress cash market fed cattle prices (but an 
empirical test of this was beyond the scope of this study).  Instead packer fed cattle appeared to be used recently 
to provide a relatively steady flow of cattle to the plant.  Another slant to this issue is that several cattle feeders 
we visited with indicated that packer feeding of cattle increased feeder cattle prices relative to what they would 
be if packers were not in that market.  The issue of packer feeding deserves on-going assessment and industry 
surveillance because potential exists for packers to use packer-owned cattle (and perhaps to some extent, other 
captive supplies) for leverage in cash market fed cattle purchases.  Thus, level and variability of packer-owned 
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cattle feeding and associated price impacts deserve empirical analyses. 
Based on our research for this study we offer a few generalizations regarding captive supply in Canada: 
• Negative cash market effects are likely to increase with an increase in proportion of captive supplies 
(especially packer-owned fed cattle) to total harvested fed cattle, giving buyers increased opportunities to 
use captive supplies as a leveraging tool,  
• Negative cash market effects from captive supplies are likely to increase with an increase in the week-to-
week variability of captive supplies, giving buyers increased opportunities, or the appearance, of using 
captive supplies as a leveraging tool. 
• Negative cash market effects from captive supplies are likely to be associated with a specific type of pre-
committed supply and specific firm if key buyers tend to rely on a single, respective type of captive supply 
method consistently; e.g. one buyer primarily using packer ownership of cattle and one primarily using 
contracts. 
• Negative cash market effects from captive supplies are likely to increase as buyer market structure becomes 
increasingly concentrated, as when a major market intervention occurs such as the border closing.  However, 
this is also when the benefits are greatest for producers involved in marketing agreements with packers. 
Despite potential negative price impacts, it is important to recognize there are clearly both identified benefits and 
drawbacks for cattle producers associated with captive supplies.  As such tradeoffs exist for any potential policy 
action regarding captive supplies.  Quantification of net and differential impacts of various captive supply 
methods is necessary before policies that might regulate these activities can be adequately assessed.  Without 
doubt, legislation that somehow controls or limits who can own and feed cattle or how cattle can be marketed 
will be detrimental to at least some cattle producers and other beef industry participants. 
Most marketing agreement base prices are tied to plant-average cash market fed cattle prices.  When cash fed 
cattle markets become thinly traded, as they have during some weeks in Canada, this can result in making it 
easier for packers to influence the plant-average price with a relatively small number of cash market fed cattle 
purchases.  Comparing the plant average price to a CanFax price quote as a check of whether the base is 
reflective of market conditions is useful.  However, the packer’s own prices paid for cash cattle (i.e., the plant-
average price) is part of the CanFax price quote so one is somewhat comparing the packer’s price to itself when 
comparing it to the CanFax price.  This may support reasons for mandatory price reporting in Canada to increase 
the confidence that cash price summary market information is representative.  Further support for mandatory 
price reporting is to increase information and reliability regarding types and levels of captive supply fed cattle 
marketings each week.  Considerable work is required regarding the details of how mandatory price reporting 
would work in Canada.  For example, what and how data would be collected, what and how it would be reported, 
whether or not exported cattle would be included, cost, funding, and responsible organization, etc.  However, we 
do not expect mandatory price reporting, if enacted, to increase fed cattle price by any noticeable amount.  
Fed cattle prices in Canada have experienced considerable volatility in recent times and relatively predictable 
historical relationships between Canada and US cash fed cattle prices have become highly variable.  Several 
reasons might be hypothesized for this reduced market integration between Canada and US fed cattle markets.  
However, a thorough understanding and quantification of the determinants of, and dynamics associated with 
these price relationships is critical to understanding the relevant geographic market for fed cattle which has 
implications for price competitiveness and for monitoring fed cattle prices in Canada.  We recommend formal 
research into the cash-to-cash basis levels between Canada and US fed cattle markets. In addition, development 
of an on-going market or industry economic surveillance model is recommended. 
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Background Information 
Cattle producers, industry analysts, policy makers, and others 
have voiced concerns about fed cattle price discovery for 
many years.  As cattle markets have transitioned from 
predominantly cash-market sealed-bid or negotiated price 
discovery to more formula pricing, marketing agreements, 
contracts, and packer-owned cattle feeding, concerns about fed 
cattle price discovery have escalated.  High levels of 
concentration in beef packing in Canada, exacerbated by cattle 
trade restrictions with the US that limited market access, have 
caused further unease with the Canadian fed cattle price 
discovery process.  The magnitude of concern has prompted 
producers and policy makers in Canada and the US to propose 
legislation limiting who can own and feed cattle and 
regulating how fed cattle can be priced or marketed.  
Producers who – for a variety of reasons – have adopted 
pricing formulas, marketing agreements, contracts, and/or 
vertically integrated into owning packing plants (as well as 
many that have not) largely oppose restrictions on how fed 
cattle can be marketed and who can own and feed cattle.  As 
such, the policy debate surrounding legislating the fed cattle 
price discovery process, pricing methods used, and cattle 
ownership restrictions is contentious.  The primary purpose of 
this study is to provide the Alberta beef industry insight 
regarding potential fed cattle price discovery and related 
market impacts of evolving fed cattle marketing methods.  
Efficient fed cattle price discovery is essential for sending 
appropriate and accurate price signals to market participants.  
Price discovery is the process by which buyers and sellers 
settle upon the sale price for a particular transaction.  Price 
discovery is efficient when individual transaction prices 
accurately reflect expected market fundamental supply and 
demand conditions.  In an efficient market, as new information 
arises that affects supply and/or demand, discovered prices 
quickly react to and reflect this news. Anything that inhibits 
market information flow reduces price discovery efficiency 
resulting in inappropriate market signals sent to market 
participants.  Furthermore, as market conditions, structure, and 
scope change, the types of market information needed also 
evolve.  Enhancing attributes of market information and price 
discovery can be more costly than realized benefits; thus costs 
and benefits need to be considered as enhanced market 
information collection and dissemination are evaluated.  
Imbalances in market power between buyers and sellers (e.g., 
many small-volume sellers and few large-volume buyers of 
fed cattle) can further impact fed cattle prices.  However, 
potential adverse impacts of market power imbalances are 
greatly reduced by complete market information flow.  
In addition to information affecting price discovery efficiency, 
thinly traded markets, especially in the presence of market 
power imbalances between buyers and sellers, can adversely 
affect prices.  Thinly traded markets refer to markets with low 
volume of transactions that are also often characterized by low 
levels of liquidity, large volatility in prices across transactions, 
and prices not adequately reflecting market fundamentals.  
Thin cash markets can be created by structural changes in the 
way cattle are marketed such as if contracts and marketing 
agreements that are not part of daily or weekly price discovery 
become dominant methods of trade.  If formula pricing for 
example grows to represent the vast majority of a market, the 
remaining cash market trade can become thin.   
Together, concerns about 1) market information, 2) 
imbalances in market power between producers and beef 
packers, and 3) thin markets have become significant sources 
of consternation for some beef industry participants.  
Determining how these factors affect fed cattle prices requires 
empirical analyses of data from the relevant market of interest.  
Impacts of these conditions on fed cattle markets (and 
elsewhere) have been thoroughly studied.  Certainly the three 
concerns are related to each other and need to be considered 
jointly.  We consider each of these issues as we focus on how 
the relatively recent growth in non-cash market, fed cattle 
trade in Canada (i.e., captive supplies) has likely affected fed 
cattle price discovery.  
A wealth of research has been conducted on short-run market 
impacts, and longer term benefits and drawbacks, of the 
variety of non-cash marketing arrangements present in fed 
cattle markets.  In particular, emphasis is placed on captive 
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supply impacts, which can be categorized or defined in a 
number of different ways.  Here we will use a definition of 
captive supplies to refer to any fed cattle that are pre-
committed to a particular beef packer beyond the typical two-
week cash market window, regardless of when price is 
established.  We include all grid cattle deliveries in this 
definition because they are known to a large extent by the 
packer well in advance of announced delivery by the cattle 
feeder.   
A review and synthesis of this literature is provided to help 
understand potential industry impacts.  Most research on this 
issue has been conducted in the US where market structure, 
mixture of marketing arrangements, and fed cattle marketing 
methods and dynamics differ from that in Canada.  We try to 
bridge this gap by bringing aspects of the Canadian fed cattle 
market to the discussion surrounding empirical results.  We 
also offer suggestions for specific research and management 
and reporting of market information the Canadian beef 
industry may want to consider.  
Objectives 
The overall objective of this project is to assess the potential 
impacts of captive supply arrangements on the Alberta beef 
industry.  Specific objectives include the following. 
1. Based on past research conducted in North America, 
summarize the relationship between captive supplies 
and short run fed cattle cash market prices.  
  
2. Based on past research conducted in North America, 
summarize motivations for and assess benefits and 
drawbacks of captive supply arrangements. 
   
3. Determine similarities and differences in beef 
packing industry structure and fed cattle marketing 
and ownership methods between Alberta and the US 
that might impact how captive supply arrangements 
affect cattle markets.   
 
4. Identify market information needs relevant to the 
Canadian cattle industry that might reduce 
information asymmetry regarding marketing 
arrangements and prices for cattle producers and 
enhance industry competitiveness.  
 
5. Identify research needs to better understand impacts 
of various cattle ownership, marketing methods and 
arrangements, and beef packer structure on fed cattle 
markets.  
Procedures   
To accomplish our objective, we conducted an extensive 
literature review of studies relating to captive supply in fed 
cattle markets.   Because the majority of this work has been 
completed relative to the US industry, we extract the likely 
relevance to Alberta where packer concentration is greater and 
a different mix of captive supply arrangements is present. 
An integral component of the “relevancy” issue to Canada is 
comparing the US and Canadian (Alberta) packing industry 
structures and marketing/pricing practices of packers and 
feeders.  A recent survey of all Canadian feedlots in 2005 
sought information which paralleled information obtained in 
two US cattle feeding surveys conducted in 2002 and 2004.  
Comparable information exists on size and location of 
feedlots, extent of custom feeding, how feedlots price cattle, 
extent of purchases to the largest buyer, and related 
information.  Also sought in the surveys were cattle feeder 
perceptions of marketing issues and potential policy solutions.  
Public information is available to compare the packing 
industry structure in Alberta with that in the US.  We rely 
heavily on this survey information in our assessment. 
Another integral component of assessing impacts of captive 
supply arrangements on fed cattle markets required us gaining 
a better understanding of details of various captive supply 
arrangements which exist in Canada.  This is important to 
understand the flow of cattle to each of the major plants and 
any timing impacts associated with deliveries of marketing 
agreement or packer-owned cattle.  Therefore, in-person 
interviews with numerous industry participants in beef 
packing and cattle feeding in Alberta were conducted to gain 
increased understanding of details of marketing arrangements 
present as well as to better understand concerns and strategies 
currently underway for managing these concerns.  
The type and quality of information available to market 
participants is critical to market efficiency, and information 
asymmetry between buyers and sellers can be detrimental to 
the information-deficit side of the market.  Therefore, market 
information available to fed cattle buyers and sellers in 
Alberta was carefully reviewed and compared with 
information available to US buyers and sellers. 
Lastly, this project distills the above information from the 
literature review, packing industry structure, marketing and 
pricing practices of packers and feeders, and available 
information to provide insight into potential impacts of captive 
supplies on the Canadian beef industry.  Based upon our 
review and assessments, we also provide future research 
needs. 
US and Canadian Captive Supplies, Packer 
Concentration, and Pricing Methods 
Estimating captive supply impacts in Canada requires 
understanding the market environment in which studies were 
conducted in the US.  Likewise, it requires understanding both 
similarities and differences between market structure in the 
US and Canada. 
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Captive Supply Comparison and Concerns – 
US and Canada 
Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards 
Administration (GIPSA), US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) has collected data from 
packers since 1988 on methods packers use to 
purchase fed cattle.  Reported summary data are 
considered official captive supply figures in the 
US.   Figure 1 shows the four largest beef 
packers’ combined annual percentage of fed 
steer and heifer purchases procured by 
contracts/agreements, packer-owned feeding, and 
the total since the special survey began.  Note 
that GIPSA began reporting audited packer data 
in 1999, which accounts in part for what appears 
to be a significant increase in captive supplies for 
1999 and following years.  Some of the increase 
resulted from clarification of GIPSA definitions 
in reporting procurement information from 
packers.  Total captive supplies in the US peaked 
in 2002 at 45% of total steer and heifer slaughter 
and have declined somewhat the past two years.   
Annual averages fail to account for the dynamics 
of packer purchases.  Data available since 
mandatory price reporting enables tracking how 
the percent of total fed cattle slaughter varies by 
procurement method.  Figure 2 shows weekly 
percent of purchases for US packers by 
negotiated (cash) trades, forward contracts, 
formula-based grid trades, negotiated-based grid 
trades, and packer-owned transfers.  Note that 
negotiated-based grid trades only began being 
reported in April 2004.  
From data reported in Figure 2, we can estimate 
captive supplies.  However, exactly what type of 
procurement methods to include in captive 
supplies is a question.  Figure 3 shows captive 
supplies estimated in two ways.  The single 
captive supply line prior to April 2004 splits into 
two lines after that date.  The first method of 
estimating captive supplies consists of formula-
based grid trades, forward contracts, and packer-
owned transfers.  After April 2004, the lower 
line is the continuation of captive supplies 
defined in this manner.  The second method adds 
negotiated-based grid trades to the first estimate, 
some of which may be trades committed at least 
14 days in advance of delivery, the time typically 
used in defining captive supplies, but some may 
not be committed that far in advance.  The line 
lying above the other after the two lines split is 
the estimate of captive supplies after April 2004 
with the inclusion of negotiated-based grid 
trades.  Using the latter definition, the highest 
Figure 1. Annual average captive supplies as a percent of steer and 
heifer slaughter by the four largest US beef packers, 1988-2004
Source: Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration
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Figure 2. Weekly US fed cattle trades by procurement method as a
percent of total fed cattle purchases, January 2003 to June 2006
Source: Agricultural Marketing Service
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Figure 4. Annual average captive supplies as a percent of steer and 
heifer slaughter by the three largest Alberta beef packers, 1998-2005
Source: CanFax
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Figure 5. Weekly Alberta fed cattle trades by procurement method as 
a percent of total voluntarily reported trades, January 2004 to 
September 2006
Source: CanFax
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weekly percentage of captive supplies occurred in 
December 2003 and reached a peak of 78.6%.  On 
two other occasions, the weekly percent of captive 
supplies exceeded 70%.  Typically the weekly 
percentage ranged from 50-60%.  Excluding 
negotiated-based grid trades, the weekly percentage 
typically ranged from 40-50%. 
There is no “official” estimate of captive supplies in 
Canada or Alberta.  CanFax reports an annual 
percentage of packer purchases of fed cattle by 
Alberta packers.  Packers voluntarily report 
purchases by procurement methods.  Figure 4 shows 
the captive supply estimates since 1998.  Estimates 
are divided into contracts, formula trades, or grid 
sales, and packer-owned transfers.  The annual 
percentage of captive supplies peaked in 2001 and 
2002 at 40%, similar to the US both in the time 
period of the peak and close to the highest 
percentage.  Since then, captive supplies have 
declined somewhat. 
The annual average figures for Alberta also fail to 
account for the dynamics of packer purchases.  
CanFax began reporting in April 2004 voluntarily 
reported sales of fed cattle from CanFax members 
by marketing method.  Figure 5, just as Figure 3 for 
the US, shows that procurement methods vary from 
month to month.  The highest percentage of captive 
supplies, based on the summation of forward 
contracts, grid trades, and packer-owned transfers, 
was 67% in November 2004 and January 2005. For 
2006, captive supplies have comprised 51-63% of 
the total reported sales. Contract trades peaked at 
22% in April 2004 but through all of 2006 have 
been below 10%.  Grid transactions reached their 
peak in December 2004 at 45% of reported trades.  
Grid pricing in 2006 has ranged from 28-44%.  
Packer-owned transfers peaked at 31% in January 
2005 and have ranged from 15-23% in 2006. 
In a mail survey in 2005, Canadian feedlot managers 
expressed concern about the potential decline in 
cash market trading since the cash market serves as 
the reference market for grid pricing (Ward, 
Brocklebank, and Carlberg 2006).  Their concerns 
were stronger than those expressed by US cattle 
feeders (Schroeder et al. 2002) (Figure 6). 
Some feedlot managers track the base price in grids 
relative to cash market prices reported by CanFax 
members.  A relatively high percentage of Canadian 
feeders also believe cash market fed cattle prices are 
lower when packers have cattle contracted for future 
delivery. Again, the concern expressed by Canadian 
feeders paralleled but exceeded that expressed by 
US feedlot managers (Figure 7).
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Price Discovery and Captive Supply Implications                                                                                                                           8 
Packer Concentration Comparison 
– US and Canada 
GIPSA also reports the official 
concentration statistics for 
meatpackers in the US.  Figure 8 
shows the combined market share of 
the four largest beef packers since 
1972 for steer and heifer slaughter and 
for boxed beef production.  This 
statistic is often called the four-firm 
concentration ratio and is believed by 
some economists to be an indicator of 
market power by the largest firms.  
The four largest beef packers in the 
US have accounted for about 80% of 
fed cattle slaughter since the early 
1990s.  The same four firms have 
accounted for a slightly higher 
percentage of boxed beef production 
(80% or higher) since 1987. 
Figure 7. Percentage response, US (2002) and Canada (2005), to: 
Cash market bids by packers are lower when packers have cattle 
contracted with feeders
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No comparable packer concentration figures are available for 
Canada.  In Alberta, the four-firm concentration figure would 
approach 100%, since nearly all fed cattle slaughter occurs in 
plants owned by four packers.  While seemingly higher than 
the US, it should be noted that the Alberta figure is being 
compared with a concentration measure for all of the US.  
Figure 9 shows the location of the major fed cattle 
slaughtering plants in the US.  In many states, there are only 
one or two large plants, not unlike Alberta, which has two 
large plants and two smaller ones.  However, a state-level or 
province-level concentration measure may be too narrow to be 
an accurate indicator of buyer competition.  Alberta feedlot 
managers responding to a 2005 survey reported 76.8% of their 
fed cattle were marketed to the largest buyer in 2004.  This 
figure compared with 69.0% among US feedlot respondents 
for 2001.  Thus, concentration in Alberta might be judged 
slightly higher than in the US.  That may be especially true 
when considering one major difference between the US and 
Canada.  The US has several adjacent states with large fed 
cattle slaughter, thus leading to substantial interstate 
movement between some states as well as interstate 
competition among plants.  In Canada, however, relatively 
little interprovincial movement of fed cattle occurs. 
Important to measuring buyer competition in Alberta is not 
interprovincial movement but international movement.  As 
long as the US-Canadian border is open, US packers can and 
do compete for fed cattle from Alberta feedlots along with 
Canadian packers.  Canadian feedlots reported that in 1999, 
67.9% of fed cattle were sold to packing plants located in 
Alberta (Ward, Brocklebank, and Carlberg 2006).  The second 
largest percentage (20.9%) was exported to US packing plants 
(note some of the plants that Alberta fed cattle are sold to in 
the US are also owned by the same parent company as the two 
largest Alberta packers).  As expected, the border closing in 
2003 greatly changed marketing patterns for many Canadian 
feeders.  In 2004, 89.4% of fed cattle were sold to plants in 
Alberta.  The percentages sold to plants in Saskatchewan 
between 1999 and 2004 changed relatively little (4.2 and 
4.9%, respectively) and similarly for Ontario (5.6 and 4.8%, 
respectively).  Therefore, most of the change resulted from 
fewer fed cattle being exported to the US.  This illustrates the 
importance of an open border to buyer competition for fed 
cattle in Alberta, and likely all of Canada. 
Price Discovery under Alternative Packer Procurement 
Methods 
Feedlot managers in Alberta, as in the US, price fed cattle by 
several methods.  Canadian feedlot managers in a 2005 survey 
were asked to identify how cattle marketed from their feedlot 
were priced (Ward, Brocklebank, and Carlberg 2006).  Sealed-
bid pricing (either live- or dressed-weight) was the 
predominant pricing method in Alberta, accounting for 50.5% 
of fed cattle marketings in 2004 by respondent feedlots, with 
rail pricing second at 28.0%.  Grid pricing in Alberta 
accounted for 5.7% in 2004 while contracting accounted for 
6.4%.  The remaining 9.6% was priced by some other method. 
Among all Canadian respondents, the mixture of pricing 
methods anticipated to be used in 2009 equalized somewhat.  
Use of sealed bids as a percentage of fed cattle marketed was 
anticipated to decline to 32.6%; rail pricing, to decline to 
26.0%; grid pricing, to increase to 19.4%; and contracting, to 
increase to 13.2%.  Smaller feedlots tended to use sealed-bid 
pricing in 2004 somewhat more than larger feedlots, while 
larger feedlots relied more on rail pricing.  Grid pricing was 
slightly higher among larger feedlots while contracting was 
slightly higher for smaller feedlots.  
Feedlot managers indicated having 2-5 buyers bid on fed cattle 
as long as the US-Canadian border remains open.  The number 
of bidders implicitly assumes the historical percentage of 
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trades by procurement method.  Should the 
percentage of captive supplies increase, the 
likely number of potential bidders would 
decline, even with an open border.  
Negotiated and sealed-bid trades are on 
either a live-weight or dressed-weight 
basis.  Some feedlot managers identify a 
day and time deadline for receiving bids 
from packers, i.e., the sealed bid procedure 
for marketing fed cattle.  After all bids are 
received, the feedlot manager determines 
the successful bidder.  One notable feature 
of sealed bid pricing, is that several 
feedlots phone each bidder after the sealed 
bid deadline and tell each bidder what the 
winning bid was as well as the competing 
packers’ bids.  We discuss more about this 
later. 
Grid pricing consists of a base carcass-
weight price in conjunction with a price 
grid or matrix of carcass premiums and 
discounts for carcass attributes.  Thus, each 
animal receives a unique price reflecting its 
actual wholesale value.  Unlike sealed-bid 
or rail pricing, each animal in the sale lot 
receives the same price.  An issue in the 
US, and equally relevant in Canada, has 
been how the base price in grids is 
discovered (Schroeder et al. 1998). 
The most common method of determining 
the base price among feedlot respondents in 
Alberta was a formula tied to the plant 
average cost of cattle (43.5% of total grid 
priced marketings).  For all Canadian 
respondents, smaller feedlots tended to use 
a formula tied to a cash market price quote 
(40.6% of total grid priced marketings), 
whereas larger feedlots used a formula tied 
to the plant average cost of cattle (52.2%).  
In both cases, the cash market is the 
reference market for the formula base price 
in the grid priced transaction. 
Figure 8. The combined market share of the four largest US beef 
packing firms, 1972-2004
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Figure 9. Major US fed cattle slaughtering plants for the four largest 
beef packers
Tyson Foods
Swift & Co.
Excel/Cargill
Farmland National Beef
In the US, feedlots responding to a 2004 survey were divided 
into those using grid pricing for 50% or less of their fed cattle 
marketings in 2003 and those using grid pricing for more than 
half their marketings (Ward 2005).  For the heaviest users of 
grid pricing, the base price was determined most frequently by 
a formula tied to a quoted price (39.1% of total marketings), 
followed by using a formula tied to the plant-average cost of 
cattle (29.6%) and a negotiated base price (23.5%).  Therefore, 
for both US and Canadian cattle feeders, formula pricing with 
the cash market as the reference market was the most common 
method of determining base prices in grids. 
Formula pricing grid sales to the cash market presents a 
potential “lemons market” phenomenon (Akerlof 1970).  As 
noted, the majority of base price arrangements are formula 
prices tied to a reported cash market price or a plant-average 
price where the cattle are expected to be slaughtered.  The key 
issue is whether fewer, lower quality cattle marketed in the 
cash market comprise the base price for higher quality cattle 
marketed on a grid.  As fewer total cattle are priced on a 
sealed-bid or rail basis, the reference market for the formula 
base price may erode to the point of not reflecting true supply-
demand conditions.  The concern expressed by Canadian cattle 
feeders regarding this “thin market” issue was discussed above 
and shown in Figure 6.  In order to formula price to a 
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cash market and be assured the base 
price reflects actual supply-demand 
conditions for the quality cattle 
marketed, there needs to be a viable 
cash market with a substantial volume 
of trades. Base prices can be 
discovered in a number of ways as 
we’ve seen.  Two other alternatives are 
to formula price to an alternative 
reference market, such as the 
wholesale market (boxed beef cutout 
value) or futures market. 
A disadvantage with formula pricing 
tied to a cash market is that packers 
have a natural, normal incentive to bid 
as low as possible for fed cattle.  Fed 
cattle are a major input and the single 
largest expense, thus packers work to 
keep their input costs as low as 
possible.  In doing so, feeders formula 
pricing to the cash market are tying 
their fed cattle prices to a market in 
which packers work to keep as low as 
possible.  An alternative is to tie  
Figure 10. Percentage response, US (2002) and Canada (2005), to:
Formula base prices in grids should be tied to boxed beef or retail 
markets
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formula prices to another market, such as the boxed beef 
(wholesale beef) market.  In this case, boxed beef represents 
the largest revenue item for packers and a market in which 
they have a natural, normal incentive to push as high as 
possible.  Therefore, formula pricing fed cattle tied to the 
boxed beef market ties fed cattle to a market packers try to 
push higher.  Over two-thirds of Canadian feeders and over 
three-fourths of US feeders recognize the advantage associated 
with tying formula prices to the boxed beef or retail market 
(Figure 10). 
Feedlot managers indicated they determine the week fed cattle 
will be shipped and packers determine the day of the week.  
This seems to be the norm whether for live weight or rail 
priced cattle or grid priced cattle.  With cash market trades 
(both live weight and rail trades), the feedlot determines the 
shipment week by what is put on the show list and the 
conventional one week pickup after purchasing the cattle.  
With grid pricing, packers may know the delivery week one-
to-three weeks prior to harvest. 
Rail prices are discovered the same week as the week fed 
cattle are harvested.  However, with grid prices, the formula 
price may be tied to this week’s cash market price (either a 
quoted price or packer cost of cattle) or the preceding week’s 
cash market price. 
There exists some negotiated grid pricing.  This may be 
referred to as “bid the grid” pricing.  A feedlot may solicit 
base price bids for a specific grid, either one the feedlot gives 
to the packer or one the packer is using.  This combines grid 
pricing with negotiated or sealed bids from buyers.  It 
encourages competitive bidding among packers purchasing 
fed cattle with a grid, while seeking premiums associated with 
desirable carcass characteristics.  However, given that most 
packer grids differ on quality and yield premiums and 
discounts, bidding on the base price is only part of the value-
determination process. 
Captive Supply Impacts in the US and 
Conjecture for Canada 
Recap of Previous Captive Supply Research 
Considerable research related to captive supplies has been 
conducted in the US (Table 1).  A cursory summarization of 
the empirical research suggests there is typically an inverse 
relationship between captive supplies and cash market fed 
cattle prices.  The estimated price impact has typically been 
relatively small, often less than $0.05/cwt to as much as 
$0.40/cwt.  This negative relationship was found in studies 
that used monthly average prices in selected states as well as 
transaction prices from an area as large as the entire US. 
There is no clear empirical evidence that the negative effect on 
prices is driven by beef packer oligopsony power motivations; 
i.e., to leverage pre-committed supplies against purchases in 
the cash market.  However, theoretical research tends more 
often to point toward an anticompetitive motivation.  This 
might suggest a negative effect at some unknown level of 
captive supplies.  Expressed motivations by packers for 
captive supplies tend to be related to securing a supply of 
consistent, high quality cattle.  Other research suggests both 
feedlots and packers use pre-committed supplies to reduce 
transaction costs in the procurement/marketing process.  There 
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Table 1.  Summary of Relevant US Research Related to Pre-Committed (Captive) Supplies and Their Impacts 
Research 
Study Data Unit 
Data 
Area 
Data 
Period Major Relevant Findings or Conclusions 
Elam 1992 Months State 1988-91 
Lower fed cattle prices associated with higher deliveries of pre-
committed supplies 
Hayenga and 
O'Brien 1992 Weeks State 1988-89 No consistent effects from captive supplies 
Schroeder et al. 
1993 Transactions 
Local 
market 1990 
Lower fed cattle prices were associated with higher levels of forward 
contracting. 
Azzam 1996 Quarters U.S. 1978-93 
Evidence was found of a monopsony-inefficiency motive for vertical 
integration of fed cattle procurement by packers. 
Azzam 1998 NA NA NA 
A conceptual model of packer use of pre-committed supplies 
suggests an inverse relationship between price and pre-committed 
supplies is not due to non-competitive behavior, and the price effect 
from captive supplies is ambiguous. 
Ward, Koontz, 
and Koontz 
1998 Transactions U.S. 1992-93 
Lower fed cattle prices were associated with increased deliveries of 
two types of pre-committed supplies. 
Love and 
Burton 1999 NA NA NA 
A conceptual model of packer use of pre-committed supplies 
suggests packers pay a lower price for pre-committed supplies and 
increase plant efficiency. 
Zhang and 
Sexton 2000 NA NA NA 
A conceptual model of packer use of pre-committed supplies 
suggests packers may create a geographic buffer between rival 
firms, thus reducing competition and resulting in lower prices paid 
for livestock. 
Lawrence, 
Schroeder, and 
Hayenga 2001 
Packer 
surveys U.S. 2000 
Packers' indicated their primary reasons for contracting with feeders 
was to secure higher quality and more consistent quality cattle. 
Schroeter and 
Azzam 2003 Transactions Region  1995-96 
Lower fed cattle prices were associated with increased deliveries of 
pre-committed supplies.  Higher fed cattle prices were associated 
with one type of pre-committed supplies. 
Schroeter and 
Azzam 2004 Transactions Region 1995-96 
Lower fed cattle prices were associated with high relative levels of 
pre-committed supplies.  Packers with higher levels of pre-
committed supplies paid lower prices than packers with lower levels 
of pre-committed supplies. 
Xia and Sexton 
2004 NA NA NA 
A theoretical model of top-of-the-market contracting was found to 
have anticompetitive implications in concentrated markets when 
contracts are exclusive and buyers purchase cattle both in the cash 
and contract market. 
Crespi and 
Sexton 2004 Transactions Region 1995-96 
A study simulating bids on fed cattle in a concentrated market 
compared with actual bidding found actual sale prices were lower 
than simulated bids. 
Hunnicutt, 
Bailey, and 
Crook 2004 Transactions Region 1995-96 
Packer-feedlot relationships were found to be quite stable over time 
and resulted from an attempt by both parties to reduce transaction 
costs. 
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is anecdotal evidence at least that feedlots have often taken the 
initiative to form long-term marketing contracts or agreements 
with packers.  The 2002 survey in the US found virtually no 
evidence packers coerced feeders into using contracts or 
agreements (Schroeder et al. 2002). 
Studies conducted on captive supply impacts in the US have 
been varied.  Note from Table 1 that the data unit, data area, 
and data period have varied.  Not shown in the table is the 
difference in the empirical or theoretical modeling across 
these studies.  All these factors make an apples and apples 
comparison difficult across the research conducted and 
complicate any conjectures about past research for current and 
future impacts. 
Another observation about the US research should be made as 
we attempt to relate the relevance of these studies to Alberta.  
We could and should ask how relevant these previous studies 
are in the US today.  Note that for the data periods identified, 
the level of captive supplies is quite a bit lower than what we 
know exists today.  The ending data period for all empirical 
studies is 1996.  According to Figure 1, the total level of 
captive supplies for the four largest packers that year was 
22%.  Note also from Figure 1 the peak to date was twice that 
level, in 2002.  Data shown in Figure 3 suggest even higher 
levels of captive supplies since 2004.  Therefore, whether or 
not and how much the empirical results might differ for 2002 
or today, relative to the periods in which prior research was 
conducted, is unknown.  Economists generally would likely 
agree the extent of any negative effects from captive supplies 
would probably increase as the proportion of captive supplies 
increase.  However, they also agree that if captive supply by 
packers lowers costs of operation in the long run (because of 
more efficient plant utilization, better planning, etc.), these 
lower costs could be in part passed on to cattle feeders in the 
form of higher prices.  To date, no study has been able to 
measure these potential cost savings. 
How relevant are the US studies to Alberta?  Assume for the 
moment comparability in market structures between the US 
and Alberta.  Captive supply data shown in Figure 4 do not 
extend back to 1996, the last data year for studies in the US.  
But captive supplies in Alberta for the earliest year reported 
(1998), exceed the GIPSA-reported level for the US in 1996 
and have increased since that time, as they have in the US. 
Market structures between the two countries appear similar, as 
noted above when comparing number of packers, 
concentration of buyers, and marketing to the largest buyer.  
This comparability is contingent on the US-Canadian border 
remaining open and fed cattle moving relatively freely from 
Alberta to US packing plants.  The border closure changes the 
market structure dramatically.  In that case, a smaller number 
of potential bidders are available to purchase fed cattle in 
Alberta, given a small volume and percentage of 
interprovincial fed cattle movement either eastward or 
westward from Alberta.  With the border open, the Alberta 
market structure parallels that of many US states in which 
there is high intrastate concentration which is mitigated 
considerably by competition from buyers located in adjacent 
states.  
Market structure also affects the potential impacts from 
captive supplies.  As the level of captive supplies increase and 
the degree of buyer concentration also increase, the more 
likely any negative effects from captive supplies will increase.  
Therefore, conjecturing on the potential effects from captive 
supplies in Alberta depends on whether or not the US-
Canadian border remains open. 
Another issue relates in part to the motivation for having pre-
committed supplies and its likely effects.  If a packer has pre-
committed supplies but those supplies do not change much in 
volume or percentage of total needs from week-to-week, the 
impact on cash market prices is likely different than if captive 
supplies vary widely.  Thus, assume a packer uses packer-
owned feeding or contracts to secure a near-constant 
percentage of its weekly slaughter needs.  The likely price 
effect is equivalent to simply having a smaller size packer 
purchasing cattle in the cash market.  The smaller size would 
be the current size less the near-constant percentage of pre-
committed supplies.  There would be relatively little 
opportunity to leverage pre-committed supplies against cash 
market prices.  If a packer’s pre-committed supplies vary 
greatly from week to week, and the packer is involved both in 
packer ownership and contracting, the possibility of 
leveraging captive supplies to gain an advantage in the cash 
market is, or appears to be, more likely.  Most empirical 
research in the US was conducted with data on pre-committed 
cattle purchases which varied considerably from week to 
week.  However, pre-committed cattle delivery timing in the 
US, much like in Canada, is determined by cattle feeders 
generally selecting the week of cattle delivery for formula 
trade cattle and packers identifying the day to take delivery 
during the week.  This suggests that aside from packer-fed 
cattle, delivery timing of most pre-committed cattle on a 
weekly basis is a result of cattle feeder decisions not packers 
using captive supply to leverage the cash market. 
As noted above (Figure 7), cattle feeders in Canada have a 
stronger view of the negative impacts from captive supplies 
than do feeders in the US.  Part of this difference may be 
related to packer profitability during the border closing (House 
of Commons 2005). 
There appears to be at least three key factors affecting the 
likely effects from use of pre-committed supplies by packers 
in Alberta.  First is the absolute level of captive supplies, 
which, as discussed, is slightly less than in the US.  Second is 
the variability of pre-committed supplies in Alberta, which it 
would seem, is somewhat comparable in Canada (as seen from 
monthly data in Figure 5) to the US (as seen from weekly data 
in Figures 2 and 3).  Third is market structure, which as 
discussed, is similar to individual feeding states in the US 
when the US-Canadian border is open.  
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A fourth factor of potential importance in Alberta combines 
motivation for using pre-committed supplies with market 
structure.  The Tyson plant at Brooks, one of the two largest 
packers in the province, owns a large feedlot (Lakeside 
Feeders) which is adjacent to the plant.  Two historical items 
should be noted.  First, the feedlot existed prior to the packing 
plant being built.  And second, ownership of the plant and 
feedlot have changed over time and ownership changes may 
have altered the relationship of cattle fed in the feedlot as a 
procurement source for the plant.  Currently, it appears the 
feedlot provides a relatively stable flow of fed cattle for the 
plant. 
Cargill, the other large packer in the province, has owned 
cattle in the past but tends to use contracts more commonly for 
pre-committed supplies.  As noted earlier, most contracted 
cattle are marketed on a grid basis, thus enabling the packer to 
target specific cattle qualities for its branded beef programs.  
While some feedlots market a reasonably predictable flow of 
cattle to the Cargill plant each week, others do not; leading to 
some degree of week-to-week variability of pre-committed 
supplies into the plant. 
A Conjecture on Captive Supply Impacts in Alberta 
The level, variability, and distribution of captive supplies 
among buyers all within the existing market structure of 
buyers and sellers may affect the impacts captive supplies 
have on cash market fed cattle prices.  Determining the trigger 
level or conditions under which captive supply effects are 
significantly negative is difficult.  A few general expectations 
or conditions seem plausible. 
• Negative cash market effects are likely to increase 
with an increase in proportion of captive supplies to 
total harvested fed cattle, giving buyers increased 
opportunities to use captive supplies as a leveraging 
tool. 
• Negative cash market effects from captive supplies 
are likely to increase with an increase in the week-to-
week variability of captive supplies, giving buyers 
increased opportunities, or the appearance, of using 
captive supplies as a leveraging tool. 
• Negative cash market effects from captive supplies 
are likely to be related to or associated with a specific 
type of pre-committed supply and specific firm if key 
buyers tend to rely on a single, respective type of 
captive supply method consistently; e.g. one buyer 
exclusively or primarily using packer ownership of 
cattle and one exclusively or primarily using 
contracts.  
• Negative cash market effects from captive supplies 
are likely to increase as the buyer market structure 
becomes increasingly concentrated, as when a major 
market intervention occurs such as the border 
closing.  However, benefits to feeders having 
marketing agreements with packers may also be 
greatest under such abnormal conditions. 
Quantifying an estimate of the net potential gains or losses 
associated with captive supplies was neither an objective nor 
feasible component of this study.  This project was not 
intended to be an empirical analysis, and without which, no 
empirical estimate is possible.  However, given above 
comparisons between Alberta and the US, based on available 
data, surveys, and interviews, a discussion of the potential net 
effect is presented here. 
Given the motives for entering into captive supply 
arrangements, there are potential advantages to the parties 
involved.  Under contracts or agreements, both feeders and 
packers may be reducing transaction costs and better targeting 
a specific quality and consistent quality of cattle marketed 
under those arrangements.  Feeders marketing fed cattle by 
grid pricing obtain carcass data which should enable them in 
purchasing feeder cattle and feeding those cattle in a manner 
which potentially results in greater premiums and minimal 
discounts when fed cattle are marketed. 
Packer feeding may enable packers to control better the 
quality and consistency of fed cattle harvested.  In addition, 
packer ownership of fed cattle enables the packer to secure 
some percentage of its weekly volume well in advance of 
harvest. 
Procuring fed cattle via captive supply methods also lends 
itself to potential adverse consequences.  As previous research 
shows quite consistently, modest levels of captive supplies 
result in small negative effects on cash market prices.  These 
small negative effects may well increase as the extent of 
procurement via captive supply methods increase.  One might 
argue that doubling the extent of captive supplies would 
potentially double the adverse effect on cash market prices; 
though no empirical or theoretical study indicates whether the 
relationship between captive supplies and adverse cash market 
prices is linearly related. 
In the US studies with the most detailed data and covering the 
largest geographic area, the negative effect on fed cattle prices 
given the modest levels of captive supplies which existed in 
the 1992-96 period was less than $0.05/cwt (in $US).  Thus, 
even doubling the adverse effect with a doubling of captive 
supply procurement, similar to the levels in 2004-06, the 
potential dollar impact remains small though larger, at 
$0.10/cwt. 
Previous estimates of captive supply impacts are essentially 
average price effects over time and space, depending on the 
data collection period and locations.  Potentially larger effects 
may occur in specific geographic areas, but these must be 
offset by smaller effects elsewhere for the average price 
effects to remain as they are estimated. 
Data available since the US began mandatory price reporting 
enables us to compare prices for fed cattle by alternative 
procurement methods.  These comparisons are useful as a 
means of comparing captive supply type purchase prices with 
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negotiated, cash market prices.  However, 
they do not account for any overall negative 
or positive price effect – if either exists – 
from increasing captive supplies. 
Figure 11 compares negotiated cash market 
prices on a live-weight basis with forward 
contract prices.  Note some weeks, there is a 
significant discrepancy between the two 
lines, though both track major changes 
reasonably well.  The price difference 
results in part to the nature of forward 
contract pricing.  However, cash market 
prices tend to lead forward contract prices 
during periods of increasing prices; and trail 
forward contract prices during periods of 
declining prices. 
Figure 12 shows a similar comparison 
between negotiated cash market prices on a 
live-weight basis with negotiated grid prices, 
which began to be reported in April 2004.  
The difference between these two lines is 
barely noticeable for most weeks.  But there 
is also evidence that cash market prices tend 
to lead negotiated grid prices during periods 
of increasing prices; and trail negotiated grid 
prices during periods of declining prices. 
Lastly, the same cash market prices are 
compared with formula prices in Figure 13.  
The week-to-week price difference is quite 
constant and can be explained in part by the 
one-week lag often found between formula 
prices this week tied to cash market prices 
last week. 
Given the price comparisons with 
mandatory price reporting data for the US, 
there does not appear to be a significant, 
consistent advantage to one pricing method 
over another.  However, these comparisons 
fail to account for any potential relationship 
between volume of captive supplies and 
price level.   
The Canadian beef industry has alternatives 
which can be taken to alter packers’ use of 
captive supplies.  One avenue is legislative 
or administrative reforms.  Canadian feeders 
were asked about outlawing contracts and 
marketing agreements in the 2005 survey, 
similar to the 2002 US survey.  Only a third 
of Canadian respondents favored a ban on 
packers contracting with feeders (Figure 14).  
More than half of Canadian respondents 
disagreed with this alternative. 
Figure 11. Comparison of negotiated, live weight cash market and
forward contract prices in the US, 2004-2006
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Figure 12. Comparison of negotiated, live weight cash market and
negotiated grid prices in the US, 2004-2006
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
1/
5/
20
03
3/
5/
20
03
5/
5/
20
03
7/
5/
20
03
9/
5/
20
03
11
/5
/2
00
3
1/
5/
20
04
3/
5/
20
04
5/
5/
20
04
7/
5/
20
04
9/
5/
20
04
11
/5
/2
00
4
1/
5/
20
05
3/
5/
20
05
5/
5/
20
05
7/
5/
20
05
9/
5/
20
05
11
/5
/2
00
5
1/
5/
20
06
3/
5/
20
06
5/
5/
20
06
7/
5/
20
06
Week
Pr
ic
e 
($
/c
w
t.)
5St DS Price NegCash Natl NegGrid DSPrice
Figure 13. Comparison of negotiated, live weight cash market and
formula prices in the US, 2004-2006
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A significantly higher percentage of 
Canadian and US respondents favored 
a ban on packers owning and feeding 
cattle (Figure 15).  One-half of 
Canadian respondents and two-thirds 
of US respondents agreed with this 
proposed ban.  Interestingly, in both 
countries, the percentage of packer 
ownership is significantly lower than 
use of contracts and agreements but 
feeders are more opposed to packer 
ownership than their use of contracts 
and agreements.  One possible 
explanation is that packers who own 
and feed cattle also become 
competitors for purchasing feeder 
cattle.  Cattle feeders then experience 
packers both as competitors for buying 
feeder cattle and selling fed cattle. 
Another avenue to help cattle 
producers market cattle more 
effectively is to increase market 
information available to them.  
Arguments have been made by some 
industry participants that presence of 
captive supply increases market 
leverage by beef packers relative to 
cattle feeders in part because 
producers do not have adequate supply 
and demand information about captive 
supplies relative to cash market cattle 
inventories to make informed 
marketing decisions.  Because of the 
importance and changing role of 
market information in price discovery, 
we delve more into detail about 
information needs. 
Figure 14. Percentage response, US (2002) and Canada (2005), to:
Packers should not be permitted to contract or form marketing 
agreements with feeders and cattle owners
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Figure 15. Percentage response, U. (2002) and Canada (2005), to:
Packers should not be permitted to own and feed cattle
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Market Information Needs in Canada and 
Possibility of Mandatory Price Reporting 
Price discovery relies critically upon market information.  
Market transparency is a foundation of efficient markets.  
Buyers and sellers discover transaction prices for individual 
lots of cattle using available information to discern 
expectations regarding demand and supply conditions.  At any 
point in time, cattle and beef supply and demand are 
unobservable and unknown.  Therefore, market participants 
must have access to market information to arrive at a price at 
which they are willing to complete a transaction.  Uninformed 
parties in a transaction face a significant probability of 
receiving or paying a price that is not representative of market 
conditions.  Because of the imbalance in market concentration 
between many small decentralized cattle feeders and few large 
beef packers, beef packers naturally possess much more 
market information than do individual cattle feeders.  
Therefore, market transparency has the potential added benefit 
of partially counter-balancing market power. 
Individual buyers and sellers have search costs in the price 
discovery process that include collecting and analyzing market 
fundamentals and finding a party to trade with in order to 
arrive at a price reflecting uncertain market conditions.  
Publicly available price quotes and developing market 
fundamentals significantly reduce search costs because they 
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reflect a wealth of information regarding supply and demand 
and they serve to communicate information to otherwise 
uniformed market participants.  However, the informational 
value of prices and other pertinent market information 
depends upon how information is collected and transmitted. 
To be effective, market information must be: 
1) timely, 
2) relevant, 
3) accurate, 
4) reliable, 
5) representative,  
6) complete and comprehensive, 
7) accessible and widely disseminated, 
8) easy to interpret, and  
9) utilized by market participants.  
Does market information currently available to the Canadian 
cattle industry possess these characteristics?  A comprehensive 
assessment of this question is beyond the scope of this project.  
However, fed cattle price discovery issues that surfaced during 
this study made it apparent that market information is a very 
important dimension of concerns surrounding captive supply.  
One aspect of our research about customary industry practices 
used when selling fed cattle on sealed bid in Canada was 
reporting of all bids to all packers at the end of the bidding 
process.  As we understand this practice, cattle feeders often 
reveal all bids to each packer at the close of a transaction in 
the sealed bid process (with variations on this practice).  
Further, individual packer bids have routinely been revealed to 
packers but not to other cattle sellers.  We suspect this practice 
evolved out of the idea that this might help packers that are 
not winning bids to better understand why and to raise their 
bids accordingly.  However, from an economic perspective, 
this is not the only probable outcome of this practice.  Though 
this is a testable hypothesis, our experience indicates that such 
a practice will tend to make all packer prices merge toward the 
center of the price bids (i.e., so bids will all be nearly the 
same).  That is, revealing all bids increases the low bid and at 
the same time reduces the high bid (not necessarily by the 
same amount).  Whether this would happen and by how much 
is an empirical question, but we expect it would result in a 
lower fed cattle transaction price because the top price is 
likely to decline as such information is revealed. 
For several reasons market information relevant to fed cattle 
price discovery has changed in recent years causing an 
evolution in information needs.  When the US border closed to 
cattle export in May 2003 following the BSE discovery in 
Alberta until the border finally re-opened to cattle trade in July 
2005, the cattle market in Canada was somewhat in disarray.  
The BSE discovery, and subsequent events, permanently 
changed the Canadian cattle market environment.  Unrest 
escalated because of how much money cattle producers lost 
and the amount of money beef packers made (House of 
Commons 2005).  Furthermore, rumors surrounding the 
evolving border situation made fed cattle markets particularly 
volatile.   
Methods of selling fed cattle have also changed making some 
market information more important and rendering some less 
important.  For example, the predominant way to sell fed 
cattle on a sealed-bid live basis, which is the focus of most 
price reporting efforts, is declining in importance.  Many 
feedlots have shifted to selling cattle on a formula-price basis 
removing these cattle from the weekly cash market price 
discovery arena.  As the 2005 survey of cattle feeders 
indicated, cattle sold by sealed-bid in Alberta declined from 
61.0% in 1999 to 50.5% in 2004.  In addition, packer feeding 
of cattle in Alberta has reached as high as 24% on an annual 
basis (Figure 4).  These issues create several potential 
concerns.   
First, removing a lot of fed cattle from the sealed-bid trade can 
make this become a thin market with few transactions during 
any given day or week.  This can make prices across 
individual transactions more volatile and potentially less 
representative of overall market conditions.  Further, the cattle 
that are left in the cash sealed-bid market tend to be those 
from smaller cattle operations or are cattle that for whatever 
reason do not perform well on a value grid.  Most cattle sold 
on grid to packers located in Alberta are sold with the base 
price calculated using the plant-average price paid for cash 
market cattle or a quoted cash market price.  If cattle 
purchased in the cash market represent a smaller number of 
transactions from a variety of decentralized smaller cattle 
operations, either of these prices can be more easily influenced 
by a few transactions.  In such a situation packers increase 
their ability to reduce fed cattle purchase prices. 
One method to monitor whether this is occurring is to 
continuously compare base prices and sealed-bid cattle prices 
being offered by a packer with those of other packers in the 
market region (e.g., comparing base prices with the CanFax 
price quote).  Of course, comparing the CanFax fed cattle 
price to a particular packer’s transaction price may not be all 
that meaningful because that packer’s price might represent a 
substantial portion of the CanFax price quote on any given 
week.  That is, one is comparing the base or transaction price 
to a price quote that is made up potentially in large part by that 
packer’s prices (similar to comparing the price to itself).  
Canada fed cattle basis relative to US fed cattle prices is used 
as another fed cattle price benchmark.  However, Canada fed 
cattle basis has become more volatile recently suggesting it is 
not as useful as it may have once been for monitoring fed 
cattle prices in Canada.  Figure 16 illustrates weekly Alberta 
cash to Nebraska cash fed steer basis.  Canada fed steer price 
went from nearly $17/cwt under Nebraska early in 2006 to just 
about even in June to back to more than $12/cwt below by 
September.  Clearly, US fed cattle price is not a reliable 
benchmark for Canadian fed cattle prices given the volatility 
in the price relationships. 
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Our visits with industry participants in 
Canada revealed a wide range in perceptions 
about how many cattle are represented in 
cash market transactions relative to other 
methods.  For example, some felt packers 
were feeding a sizeable number of their own 
cattle and that this activity adversely affects 
fed cattle prices.  Some perceived packers to 
be feeding very few cattle.  Others indicated 
packer cattle feeding does more to increase 
feeder cattle prices than to reduce fed cattle 
prices.  Some felt packer feeding of cattle 
was either miniscule and/or of little concern.  
Generally, based on our discussions, the 
feedlot owned by Tyson appears to be used 
to source cattle at a steady flow into the 
Tyson plant and thus is probably not a 
strategic reserve or cattle timing mechanism 
to influence fed cattle prices.    
Figure 16.  Alberta to Nebraska Weekly Fed Steer Basis 
(Cash to Cash)
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However, the magnitude of uncertainty and angst surrounding 
packer cattle feeding suggests that providing more frequent, 
routinely reported, and reliable information about packer cattle 
feeding could help reduce producer unrest.  This is a case 
where increased transparency could reduce anxiety as well as 
help producers in pricing and price discovery decisions. 
Based on our interviews of industry participants in Alberta, 
cattle market information provided by CanFax is widely 
recognized and heavily used by producers.  Cattle feeders 
especially use information on fed cattle markets for price 
discovery, negotiating terms of trade, negotiating contract 
specifications, and using CanFax data as a benchmark to 
determine how prices they receive compare to market-reported 
prices.  Of the small sample of industry participants we 
visited, most seemed pretty comfortable that the price data 
provided by CanFax are reliable and represent a significant 
amount of trade.  However, a couple of information gaps were 
noted by some cattle feeders:  1) information on forms of 
cattle procurement being used (including gaining a better idea 
of how thin the cash trade is) at least on a weekly basis and, 2) 
understanding packer and further downstream industry 
margins over time.  In addition to these concerns, CanFax 
price data are obtained from a sample of voluntary reports and 
thus one cannot say for sure whether they reflect the entire 
market without a more formal analysis.  CanFax data indicate 
the percentage of cattle represented in voluntary reported fed 
cattle trade by pricing method varies widely from month to 
month, ranging from 38% to 75% since the report began in 
2004.  Generally industry sentiments suggested CanFax 
reported price quotes were considered reliable and 
representative.  Having such a representative and reliable price 
series is critical for the industry especially when other 
benchmark prices such as the US are not closely integrated 
with Alberta fed cattle prices. Some have suggested that 
mandatory price reporting might help increase transparency 
and thus fed cattle price discovery in Canada.  
Mandatory Price Reporting  
Structural changes in Canadian fed cattle markets and fed 
cattle marketing methods tend to parallel what has happened 
in the US, with noted differences discussed earlier.   
Therefore, a brief background on the US mandatory price 
reporting system is useful.  In April 2001, mandatory price 
reporting went into effect in the US requiring slaughter plants 
(which slaughter 125,000 head of cattle or more, 100,000 head 
of swine or more, or slaughter/process 75,000 head of lambs 
or more annually) to report information on pricing, contracting 
for purchase, formulated sales, and supply and demand 
conditions twice daily to the US Department of Agriculture, 
Agricultural Marketing Service (Pendell and Schroeder 2006).  
In December 2004, when the Act was due to terminate, the 
Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act was extended until 
September 30, 2005.  Because Congress could not agree on 
the length of an extension of MPR, the Act expired in the fall 
of 2005.  However, USDA continued the livestock reporting 
program on a voluntary reporting basis.  In December 2005, 
results from review of MPR by the US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO 2005) were released.  GAO made 
several recommendations including increasing transparency of 
market reports by improving market reporters’ instructions 
regarding excluded transactions and reporting those effects of 
the excluded transactions, and auditing transactions from 
packers because of errors discovered by GAO in price 
reporting by packers.  In September 2006, the US Senate 
passed a bill to reauthorize the Livestock Mandatory 
Reporting Act of 1999 for another five years which from there 
went to the President.  With the US Farm Bill reauthorization 
in process, details of this Act could be embedded in some of 
that debate. 
Prior to livestock mandatory price reporting (MPR), producers 
relied on the US Department of Agriculture Agricultural 
Marketing Service (AMS) livestock market news reports for 
fed cattle price information.  These reports were generated 
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from voluntarily reported prices by producers, packers, feedlot 
operators, and other participants in the cattle industry to AMS 
market reporters.  However, over the past two decades cattle 
feeding consolidated and shifted from smaller feedlots to 
larger commercial feedlots.  In addition, cattle feeders began 
to adopt alternative methods to sell cattle, including contracts 
and marketing agreements, that were not part of the AMS 
voluntary fed cattle price reports (Perry et al. 2005).   By 
2002, 44% of fed cattle marketed were sold through these 
alternative methods (GIPSA 2002).  Increased contracting and 
formula pricing agreements resulted in there being frequently 
insufficient daily prices collected from regional fed cattle 
markets for AMS reporters to report a market price quote (US 
Department of Agriculture 2001).  As a result, the voluntary 
reporting system was criticized by some industry participants 
for not being representative of all cattle trade and not having a 
consistently reliable price publicly quoted (Grunewald, 
Schroeder, and Ward 2004).  To address these issues, while 
attempting to help facilitate price discovery, encourage 
competition, and provide all market participants with timely 
price and transaction information, Congress passed the 
Livestock Market Reporting Act of 1999.  
So what did MPR do for the US cattle industry?  The bottom 
line is it provided some new useful information and resulted in 
loss of other important market information.  What MPR 
revealed is essentially more details about numbers and general 
terms of trade for cattle procured under ways other than cash 
markets (i.e., contracts, marketing agreements, grids, etc.).  In 
addition, more price information about boxed beef sales 
became available (or at least more transactions represented in 
the reported prices).  What was lost with advent of MPR were 
price quotes for certain market regions for which the USDA 
no longer summarized prices that they did before advent of 
MPR.  Further timeliness of market information available was 
also adversely affected by MPR.  Under voluntary price 
reporting, AMS market reporters released information about 
prices during the day as they received the information.  Under 
MPR, price summaries are only made available at specified 
report release times that summarize trade that occurred the 
previous day or earlier in the current day.  No “real-time” 
market information is provided during the day. 
Would the Canadian cattle industry benefit from mandatory 
price reporting?  A recent study conducted by the George 
Morris Center reviewed MPR in the US (Grier 2004).  Grier 
concluded that MPR had increased the amount, accuracy, and 
transparency of prices to producers.  He found MPR to be less 
timely than some voluntary price reports which it replaced.  
Whether or not MPR assisted producers make better 
marketing decisions was not clear.  Lastly, he concluded that 
MPR probably had not helped producers get better prices for 
their cattle. 
The Grier report estimated additional costs for implementing a 
MPR system in Alberta at $750,000/year, split between 
packers and an agent contracted to implement the mandatory 
system.  He assumed such an agent would be or could be 
CanFax. 
Grier’s assessment of MPR in Alberta relative to the US failed 
implicitly to recognize one key attribute of US price reporting, 
whether voluntary or mandatory.  Information is a public good 
meaning that everyone individually uses it freely and 
regardless of how many people access market information, the 
amount available remains the same.  Because of this character 
of market information its value is difficult to measure for each 
user.  Each user, in turn, has difficulty placing a value on 
ensuring its timeliness, accuracy, etc.  This suggests that from 
a public perspective, individual producers would under-invest 
in information collection relative to the public value of such 
efforts.  Therefore, in the US, the cost of market information 
has been borne in large part by taxpayers rather than relying 
on the private sector.  That is not to overlook the voluntary 
price reporting efforts through such organizations as Cattle-
Fax, Texas Cattle Feeders Association, and others, which 
Grier appropriately discusses. 
An impediment to implementing MPR in Alberta as 
envisioned by Grier is the added cost to CanFax members and 
packers.  However, no consideration was given to an 
alternative means of implementing MPR, such as by Alberta 
Agriculture, Canada Agriculture, or some other public entity. 
Grier makes a critically important point that relates to the 
perception of MPR in the US.  Expectations for MPR must be 
realistic and obtainable.  As he correctly notes, MPR likely did 
not increase producer prices in the US.  While many producers 
expected higher prices to result from MPR, most economists 
expected MPR would have a neutral to no significant effect on 
price level.  MPR was expected by some economists to 
increase price variance, which it did (Perry et al. 2005).  MPR 
was expected to increase transparency and provide additional 
information regarding captive supplies, both of which have 
occurred (Ward 2006).     
The primary things that might be gleaned from MPR in 
Canada would be more information that would have more 
wide-spread industry representation every day on prices and 
methods of cattle trade.  That is, transparency of trade would 
increase because of wider coverage of a larger and more 
consistent sample of price and volume data being summarized 
each day.  However, as has been experienced in the US, MPR 
did not displace private industry price reporting services such 
as Cattle-Fax.  In fact, because of the timeliness of real-time 
data needs, it probably increased their importance in the US.  
Therefore, MPR in Canada would provide more confidence 
and verification of prices and increased information on terms 
of trade, popularity of various types of marketing methods, 
and prices for different forms of cattle trade, but it would 
likely not fully displace timely price data being collected and 
reported by CanFax.  If mandatory price reporting is pursued 
in Canada, we recommend a careful and comprehensive 
review of alternative funding methods as well as what data to 
collect, and also how best to synthesize, summarize, and 
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report the data.  A key question which must be answered is 
how trades would be collected for fed cattle exported to the 
US.  Without information on these trades, considerable 
potential value of a MPR system in Canada would be lost.  
Developing Responses to Price Discovery 
and Competition Issues: NW Consolidated 
Beef Producers and Producer-Owned 
Packers 
Canadian beef industry participants we interviewed for this 
report identified two developments initiated by producers to 
address or mitigate price discovery and competition concerns 
in Alberta.  Both parallel producer efforts in the US and each 
is discussed here. 
Northwest Consolidated Beef Producers 
Texas cattle feeders spearheaded development and 
implementation of Consolidated Beef Producers (CBP) in 
April 2000.  CBP was formed as a nonprofit corporation under 
the Texas Cooperative Marketing Act.  Its purpose is to 
market fed cattle for member feedlots who commit their fed 
cattle to the marketing cooperative.  CBP attempts to represent 
a sufficient volume of fed cattle each week to acquire 
countervailing leverage in the marketplace against larger 
packers. CBP reports marketing 1 million cattle annually 
(http://www.consolidatedbeef.com/index.html ) for its 230 
member feedlots in 15 states. 
Full members pay $3,000 plus a $1/head marketing fee.  The 
fee enables CBP to hire a manager and staff which in turn 
report to a 14-member board of directors.  Cattle are marketed 
in the manner believed to be in the best interest of member 
feedlots, whether on a live- or dressed-weight basis or grid.  If 
marketing on a grid, an attempt is made to match the cattle 
with the packer grid that will return the most possible money 
for the cattle owner. 
CBP members notify CBP staff two weeks or more prior to 
when their cattle are estimated to be ready for harvest.  At that 
point, cattle are deemed committed to CBP and CBP becomes 
the sole marketing agent for all marketing and sale decisions 
related to those cattle.  For these services, CBP members pay a 
dollar per head marketing fee. 
Feeders are asked three questions regarding their potential 
interest in joining CBP.  Those are 
1. Are you satisfied with how your cattle are being 
marketed? 
2. Do you believe the way you are marketing cattle will 
change in the near future? 
3. Do you want to participate in the change? 
CBP expressly represents cattle feeders who wish to remain 
independent but involved with a consolidated, coordinated 
marketing program. 
Several Alberta beef producers are similarly interested in 
forming an organization patterned after and perhaps tied to 
CBP and referred to as Northwest Consolidated Beef 
Producers or NW CBP.  Plans were to launch NW CBP in fall 
2006.  We visited with some Alberta feeders who planned to 
join and have promoted NW CBP as well as some feeders who 
do not plan to become members of the marketing group. 
Nearly everyone indicated the concept has merit and would be 
a positive in the marketplace for feeders and cattle producers.  
Comments varied.  Generally, more marketing alternatives are 
better than fewer.  NW CBP could reduce transaction costs for 
packers by potentially purchasing in larger volume from a 
single entity with which to negotiate prices and terms of trade 
rather than individually contacting several feedlots.  Similarly, 
it was believed that transaction costs would be reduced for 
feeders also.  Feedlot managers would spend less time and 
search costs becoming informed and contacting and 
negotiating with packers. 
Expectations regarding price and competition impacts varied 
somewhat.  There was a general view that smaller cattle 
feeding operations are less informed regarding the value of 
their cattle because of the infrequency in which they are 
involved in the market and that they generally have very little 
negotiating leverage with large packers.  Further, beef packers, 
with asymmetric information relative to feeders, were 
perceived as being able to pay less for cattle purchased from 
smaller feedlots.  If this is true, NW CBP could potentially 
improve prices received by smaller cattle feedlots.  This stems 
from reduced transaction costs as noted above and from NW 
CBP gaining a degree of countervailing leverage as well as 
having more complete market information in negotiating with 
packers.  That negotiating edge comes mostly from better 
coordinating the type of cattle to the packers most needing 
those cattle. 
Whatever price advantage is gained for some individuals, the 
overall market impact was not expected by persons we visited 
to be large.  However, it was thought any strengthening of 
market prices from enhanced competition and improved 
coordination would bolster the US-Canadian basis and support 
the base price in grids.  Furthermore, some feeders using 
formula pricing arrangements where the base price is tied to 
prices paid for cash market cattle, felt NW CBP could help 
ensure that the base price would not be as easily influenced by 
smaller operations that might receive prices lower than they 
would if NW CBP represented their cattle.   
Ranchers Beef 
Another alternative strategy to deal with fed cattle price 
discovery concerns is to form producer-owned packing firms, 
sometimes organized as a cooperative or limited liability 
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corporation.  If beef packers were enjoying substantial profit 
margins from beef processing, a producer-owned packing firm 
should be able to capture some of that margin directly for its 
producer-owners.  Further, bringing another cattle buyer to the 
marketplace would increase demand and competition for fed 
cattle which would increase cattle prices.   Canadian cattle 
feeders were asked in the 2005 survey whether additional 
producer-owned packing firms would benefit the industry.  
The degree of agreement was nearly identical to US cattle 
feeders who responded to the 2002 survey (Figure 17).  Over 
half the respondents in each country agreed. 
In the US, one such producer-owned packer has had 
considerable success.  US Premium Beef (USPB) began 
operating in December 1997.  USPB purchased a share of 
Farmland National Beef, which operated two plants in western 
Kansas.  Since then, USPB has increased its ownership of 
Farmland National Beef and purchased another producer-
owned packer, Brawley Beef, operating in California. 
The management of USPB attributes part of the company’s 
success, as measured by premiums paid to cattle owners and 
appreciation of stock in the company, to being able to develop 
branded beef products.  USPB was able to use the distribution 
channels and system that a sister organization, Farmland 
Foods, developed for its successful branded pork products. 
Several producer-owned ventures are in varying stages of 
operating or being considered in Canada.  Perhaps the early-
adopter of these is Ranchers Beef in Alberta.  Ranchers Beef 
is owned by a small group of cattlemen/investors.  Ranchers 
Beef is building its business by paralleling success of another 
related pork operation.  Ranchers Beef considers itself a niche 
or specialty player relative to the larger packers in the 
province.  The company is targeting export markets in Asia 
and elsewhere.  In our opinion, ventures like Ranchers Beef 
have a higher likelihood of being successful if they find their 
appropriate niche and do not compete directly in every facet of 
their business with much larger, more efficient, conglomerate 
beef packers.   
Reaction by feeders we visited was similar to the reaction they 
had regarding NW CBP.  More marketing alternatives are 
better than fewer.  One additional packer, even for a subset of 
the available cattle for market, creates added competition and 
can have a positive effect on prices for fed cattle.  As with 
NW CBP, any positive effect on price may strengthen the US-
Canadian basis and bolster support for the base price in grids.  
However, no one we visited expected the overall market price 
impact to be large.  
Several noted that while Ranchers Beef has a plan, the 
necessary commitment and financial backing, and market 
access, additional hurdles will be encountered.  Time will tell 
whether this venture succeeds.  Certainly success of Ranchers 
Beef or similar efforts depends in part on the expectation of 
resumption of normal beef trade with Asian countries and no 
further trade disruptions due to animal health, food safety, or 
political events. 
Research Needs 
Many of the fed cattle pricing questions being raised in 
Canada require empirical analysis. Theory provides a 
framework for developing economic analyses, but it does not 
provide sufficient conclusions about magnitude and often even 
direction of impact.  Furthermore, although, as we have 
discussed, many aspects of the Alberta fed cattle and beef 
packing market structure and environment are similar to that 
of the US, enough differences are also present that simply 
extending US research findings to Alberta is tenuous.  
Figure 17. Percentage response, US (2002) and Canada (2005), to:
More producer-owned packers would benefit the beef industry
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From our review of research, our 
examination of selected market 
information in Canada, our interviews 
with Canadian beef industry players, 
and our experience in analyzing fed 
cattle markets and conducting 
economic research, we have identified 
a few specific research needs related 
to fed cattle markets in Canada.  We 
have listed these research 
recommendations in an unranked and 
un-prioritized order.  We leave 
prioritization to Alberta Beef 
Producers. 
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1. Short-run impact of captive supply in Canada on 
cash fed cattle prices    
We have discussed captive supply research in the US that has 
consistently found an inverse relationship between cash 
market fed cattle transaction prices and captive supply.  
Results indicate very small economic impact of captive supply 
on cash fed cattle transaction prices.  However, these studies 
were conducted with captive supplies that were at much lower 
levels than currently present in Alberta.  Both formula cattle 
trade and packer-owned cattle percentages are higher now in 
Alberta than they were in any empirical work completed to 
date.  A study that calibrates how cash fed cattle market prices 
(both price level and price variability are important 
dimensions of such a study) might be affected by various 
levels of captive supply and by different types of captive 
supplies would be an important component of the proposed 
research.  We simply do not know whether one can double or 
triple prior estimates and apply them to the current Canadian 
situation.  Doing this would result in estimates that have 
unknown reliability.  We recommend that before any policies 
designed to potentially limit or control how fed cattle are 
owned or sold, careful empirical analyses be conducted to 
determine these relationships. 
2. Net and differential impact of captive supply on 
Canadian cattle producers   
Despite a sizable body of literature presenting evidence and 
arguments that presence of captive supplies provide benefits to 
both cattle feeders and beef packers (through reduced costs 
and/or improved revenues), no study has quantified these 
benefits nor compared possible benefits to potential adverse 
impacts.  As such, if short-run impacts of captive supplies on 
cash market fed cattle transaction prices are adverse, but there 
are important economic benefits to those who market cattle 
through captive supply arrangements and to beef packers who 
use captive supplies, then the net captive supply impacts on 
the industry and the differential impacts on different groups 
of participants (those involved in captive supply arrangements 
and those that are not) are critically important from a policy 
perspective.  Both beef producers and beef packers might 
enjoy net economic benefits from captive supplies of fed cattle 
even if cash fed cattle market prices decline by some amount 
when captive supplies increase.  This question has not been 
resolved because no one has measured the overall net impacts 
(positive or negative) of captive supplies or the differential 
impacts on different market players (i.e., those that do and 
those that do not use non-cash methods of fed cattle trade).  
We strongly recommend before policy prescriptions regarding 
captive supply in Canada be considered that such a study be 
completed. 
3. Determinants and Surveillance of Alberta to US 
cash fed cattle market basis 
Basis between US and Canadian cash fed cattle prices has 
been used as a barometer of fed cattle prices in Canada.  This 
is a logical comparison because cattle feeders in Canada sell 
sizeable amounts of fed cattle to packing plants located in the 
US suggesting US and Canadian fed cattle markets share 
important overlap.  However, cash fed cattle basis (difference 
between Canada and US cash fed cattle prices) has exhibited 
considerable and unprecedented variability, even with the 
border re-opened to fed cattle trade since 2005.  Undoubtedly, 
there are both short- and long-run cash market basis 
determinants between Canada and the US.  Understanding 
basis determinants will provide increased information 
Canadian cattle producers can use to assess packer bids, to 
make more informed cattle marketing decisions, manage risk, 
and to provide market surveillance and assessment of Canada 
fed cattle market conditions.  With reduced cash market cattle 
trade occurring, increased market surveillance and an 
enhanced understanding of fed cattle price relationships across 
location are increasingly important in assessing market 
performance. 
4. Market or Industry Monitoring Model for the 
Canadian Beef Industry  
Markets are dynamic and change in response to many policy 
and market-related conditions, as anyone associated with the 
Canadian cattle industry can well attest.  Canada does not have 
a regulatory body similar to the Grain Inspection, Packers and 
Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) in the US Department of 
Agriculture.  As such, there is no body providing focused 
direct oversight of competitive issues and conditions in the 
Canadian beef industry.  Development of a market or industry 
model of the entire Canadian beef industry which could be 
used on a continual basis to monitor market behavior and 
performance is recommended.  Such a model would be 
available to address issues as they arise, such as a border 
closing, packer mergers, plant closings and openings 
(including Ranchers Beef), new marketing firms (like NW 
CBP), introduction of mandatory price reporting, and other 
related developments.  Two key elements of such an effort 
would be input at the outset to ensure the model incorporates 
the degree of specificity required by the industry; and a 
commitment to update the model so that it not become simply 
a one-time effort and then forgotten.  Therefore, this would be 
a longer-term research commitment, and probably one 
extending beyond Alberta Beef Producers alone, but one that 
may provide considerable usefulness to the beef industry in 
Canada.     
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